Subject: Re: [extropy-chat] Science and Fools (was: unidirectional thrust)

From: [email-masked] ("Hal Finney")
Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2005 01:05:51 -0800 (PST)

Brett Paatsch writes:
> I wonder whether it would be possible for you, Robin, Damien and I
> to agree on a the structure of a bet (like in idea futures) that would
> judge the question "can cryonics work?" in such a way that we did
> not disagree after it had been judged.  
>
> Its seems that you and Robin hold that it might be feasible and Damien
> (if I am not mistaken [1]) and I hold that it is not feasible. 

Do you agree that it would be more accurate to say that I, and perhaps
Robin, probably estimate the likelihood that cryonics can work to be
higher than you, and perhaps Damien?

> I think all of us would agree that the question is important. 

I don't see it as necessarily all that important.  It's not something that
I give a great deal of thought to.  I do spend a few hundred dollars a
year on it, probably about the same amount I spend on Atkins diet shakes.
It's not like it's a major part of my life.  On the other hand, as I
said it does give me a sort of quasi-religious comfort and that is nice
to have.

> I wonder if it is the sort of question that we could formute into a bet.
>
> All of us respect science. All of us respect logic. All of us speak 
> English. All of us, I think would accept that science, logic and
> language are the relevant domains and that there are English
> speaking, scientifically literate and logical people that can judge
> things in these domains under some circumstances. 
>
> I wonder if we could formulate a bet and agree in advance on what
> sort of third-party judging process would be involved in determining
> "the truth". 
>
> And if we could not, I wonder why not. 

What if I were to define "cryonics can work" as something like, a
person frozen with today's technology is successfully revived within,
say, 100 years, with substantially identical memories and personality.
I would give this odds of about 1 in 100.

I know, based on our earlier discussions, that you have particular views
about the nature of identity which might make you question whether this is
a useful definition of cryonics "working".  You might be concerned that
even if someone passed this kind of objective test on revival, that he
wasn't really the same person.  If you can come up with an alternative
objective formulation, I'd be interested in hearing it.  I'd also be
curious to know what you think the odds are of it "working" according
to my definition, even if you don't agree that it is a good definition.

(And maybe I'm way off here and your objections are of a different form.)

Hal
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From: "Brett Paatsch" <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2005 22:33:56 +1100

> higher than you, and perhaps Damien?

I think your re-statement above is accurate. I don't know if its *more*
accurate.  Perhaps it is.

[BTW I don't want to characterise you, or Robin or Damien as having
views that you don't have.]

I do think that you and Robin would estimate the probability that cryonics
can work (for yourselves) as higher than I, and perhaps Damien would for
ourselves). I don't think either you or Robin would place the probability
as very high either.

> said it does give me a sort of quasi-religious comfort and that is nice

If any means of avoiding death were feasible I think that would be enough
to *interest* each of us. (Whether it would interest us *today* or at any
*particular* time or not might be a different question, one that might
depend on what else is clamouring for our attentions at the time).

I guess I'm saying, I think that we'd each acknowledge we have an
*interest* in avoiding dying and in finding out if that is possible via some
particular way or other. And I think that we'd each have an interest in
making the truth on such questions as "can cryonics work?" better
*known* (if such is possible) than they currently are. I don't mean that
any of us are fanatical about our positions. I think none of us are 
fanatical.

> I would give this odds of about 1 in 100.

Sure, that would be a line we could explore. I mean the way you are
operationaling the bet is a way that I imagine you, Robin, Damien or
I would each start to do with *some* skill if any of us were challenged
to put our money where our mouths are.

But perhaps before we even go down that path it is worth asking could
each of us accept the judgement of  *any* third party judging organisation
however ideally configured with relevant expertise, (scientific, logical,
linguistic etc) as being better than our own present judgement, and better
than our own then, our future judgement (biased judgement) when such
judgement is rendered?

In practice, both now and then, there is only two practical choices in
relation to cryonics for each of us: either we choose to sign up or we
don't.

> (And maybe I'm way off here and your objections are of a different form.)

You're not way off.  But you are getting into trying to answer the question.

I'm wondering if you can see that there is no point to trying to answer the
question unless at least two of us, one from either side of the proposition
would be willing to accept the decision of a judging organisation.

My purpose here is somewhat "meta".  I'm interested in using cryonics
as an example, and some slightly known to me different positions on it
(yours, Robins, Damien's) as a sort of test to see if people whom I think
respect each other yet hold different views can even in principle come
up with a judgeable betting procedure on something like this.

I'm interested in whether some matters ultimately cannot become matters
for third party judging even in principle when two sides start out on the
opposite sides of a question.

We know judging can be imposed and begrudgingly accepted (without
the need for us to agree with it) on some matters. I don't know if the likes
of us can advance-accept the sort of judgement that would be made on
 "can cryonics work?" though.  And if we can't advance-accept it, then
we can't get to agree.

Does that make sense?

Brett Paatsch

---

From: Robin Hanson <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 16 Mar 2005 09:15:46 -0500

>than our own then, our future judgement (biased judgement) when such

I really don't think the judging organization is the problem.  Dead vs.
alive is usually a pretty wide gulf without that many borderline cases.
I'd want to be clear if uploading counts as revival, but otherwise, sure
I'd accept many third party judgements.  Harder problems are making bets
that pay interest over such a long time, and trusting the judges and folks
holding the money to still be there when time comes to judge.

Robin Hanson  [email-masked]  http://hanson.gmu.edu
Assistant Professor of Economics, George Mason University
MSN 1D3, Carow Hall, Fairfax VA 22030-4444
703-993-2326  FAX: 703-993-2323

---

From: "Brett Paatsch" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 17 Mar 2005 11:37:34 +1100

Robin Hanson wrote:

> I'd accept many third party judgements.

But what if you couldn't be clear. What if whether uploading counts or not
is a question that must be left in the hands of the judges. The judges are
allowed to have regard to arguments for and against whether uploading
counts.  Anybody that wants to can make their best case for uploading.
And the case that uploading should count if the judges think it does, but
the judges get to decide what is and isn't germane to the question "can
cryonics work?"

> Harder problems are making bets

Quite so. Yet you, Hal, Damien and I each have to decide for ourselves
"can cryonics work? " while we are still here to decide. In other words
in a time period of decades or perhaps even years but certainly not
centuries. If we think markets can inform us, we are likely to want to be
informed in time for us to use the information. And if we want a payoff
for being right in our lifetimes we might want to assemble the arguments
and facts for the negative case (for judgement) so as to move the market
in favour of our views whilst we are alive and so can profit while alive.

Perhaps I, and/or Damien do have different ideas about what constitutes
identity to yourself and Hal. And perhaps that is part of what has us in
disagreement about "can cryonics work?" And perhaps we are wrong.
But arguments about identity if they are germane to the question "can
cryonics work?" may still be able to be considered by a judging
organisation allowed to consider them. (It seems doubtful that personal
identity can really be just a matter of taste). And they may be able to be
considered before Damien and I are dead.

I don't know if Damien would be willing to have the question of identity
(including *his* identity, amongst other things) decided by a judging
organisation even if he could have as much input as he wished into the
expertise and composition of that judging organisation.

Perhaps people who disagree want to control the terms of reference
for any third-party judgement to much and not be willing to accept
only that they get to configure the judging mechanism beforehand.
I don't know this for a fact  - I just wonder.

Would you accept judgement without the uploading being explicitly
included in the terms of reference? Would Damien accept judgement
on questions that might include the issue of identity if that judgement
presumes to apply to his notion of identity too?  In both cases a
higher degree of confidence seems required in the judges.

Yet if the bet was broken down into separate ones stipulating stuff
about uploading and identity it might make the question "can cryonics
work?", which might have had appeal to the wider community, to
esoteric and of to little interest.

Brett Paatsch

---

From: "Brett Paatsch" <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2005 09:57:30 +1100

Keith Henson wrote:

>>My purpose here is somewhat "meta".  I'm interested in using
>> cryonics as an example, and some slightly known to me different
>> positions on it (yours, Robins, Damien's) as a sort of test to see if
>> people whom I think respect each other yet hold different views 
>> can even in principle come up with a judgeable betting procedure
>> on something like this.
>>
>>I'm interested in whether some matters ultimately cannot become
>> matters for third party judging even in principle when two sides
>> start out on the opposite sides of a question.
>>
>>We know judging can be imposed and begrudgingly accepted 
>>(without the need for us to agree with it) on some matters. I don't
>> know if the likes of us can advance-accept the sort of judgement
>> that would be made on "can cryonics work?" though.  And if we 
>> can't advance-accept it, then we can't get to agree.
>>
>>Does that make sense?
> 
> I think you have in mind some rapid process to come to a present
> day agreement about "cryonics can work."
> 
> You obviously hold a strong opinion about the subject so you feel
> "cryonics can't work."
> 
> I must state that I had a similar opinion at one time, liking a frozen 
> person to a frozen tomato, looks great, but turns to mush when
> thawed out.
> 
> Eric Drexler had the same opinion prior to thinking about what 
>could be done with molecular scale machines.  I wasn't an easy sell,
> it took 5 or 6 years from starting to hear about nanotechnology
> before my family signed up.  I was eventually backed into an 
> intellectual corner where I could find no reason for cryonics not 
> to work at the technical level.  Of course I had a fairly deep science
> background of how molecular biology had developed over the
> previous 30 years.
> 
> I am increasingly confident over the last 20 years that the technical
> level of cryonics is sound.
> 
> I wonder what evidence you cite to support your opinion?

At present I don't try to cite evidence to support my opinion on
cryonics I just collect it when I come across it. My reason for this
is that I think that what originally draws people to explore cryonics
(myself included) is not truth-seeking but hope. 

When people use their reasoning skills to fortify their hopes rather 
than to try and find out what is true "evidence" tends to be looked
at as an obstacle to be gotten around not something to be weighted. 

Its possible that most cryonics supporters may not be able to
dispassionately weight "evidence" in the absence of an emotionally
favourable alternative solution. I don't know that. 

Until there is a framework into which evidence and arguments for
and against can be evenly weighted I don't want to feed a
rationalisation process. It takes too much time to do that and I don't
get any return on time invested.  I'm mortal, I value my time. 

Damien doesn't seem to be around at present but what I was hoping
to explore was whether it would be possible for people on opposite
sides of the "can cryonics work?" issue to advance-agree on any sort
of third-party judging process.  

Robin has put an enormous amount of time and effort into finding
ways of enhancing our truth seeking orientation and through his
notion of idea futures I think he may be onto something very
powerful.   I'm still probing for weaknesses and limits in idea 
futures and its mainly out of interest in that that I am looking at the
cryonics question. 

If people whose views on cryonics are as different as Hal's and 
Robin's from mine and Damien's (as I perceive them) could agree
on a judging process that would yield more truth than we each
currently have then that would be an important vindication of 
some key ideas. And if we can't then that might be informative
too. 

I see the stakes as much higher (potentially) than the single issue
of cryonics.

"Can cryonics work?" might not be the easiest thing to set up
a bet on. 

In his paper _Could Gambling Save Science?_  Robin states:

"Presumably we want as much progress as possible per effort
invested, at least in situations where the following notion of 
"progress" makes sense. Consider a well-posed question, such
as "Is the Earth basically spherical?", with a handful of possible
answers (such as "No, it's flat"). Experience indicates that, with
enough study and evidence, one of the answers will eventually
stand out as best to most anyone who considers the question
carefully. At least this seems to happen for most questions that
have been traditionally labelled "scientific"; questions about the
morality of abortion or the nature of God may not fare as well."
 
Now I can readily see that the question "Can cryonics work?"
could legitimately contain subquestions such as whether revival
from update would constitute "working" and might necessarily
involve a judgement on what constitutes identity. 

I don't see that the existence of valid subquestions makes the
main question unjudgeable however. 

I don't know if "what is identity?" is outside judgement 
informed by the best scientific evidence and the most careful
consideration of logical argument though.  

Brett Paatsch

---

From: Samantha Atkins <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2005 11:58:29 -0800

On Mar 18, 2005, at 2:40 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:

>
> You might want to read a few from http://www.21cm.com/abstracts.jsp
> (there's more in the works, by the way, stay tuned).
>
>>   a lot of the entries point to www.idealibrary.com which seems to be 
>> down or otherwise unreachable.

---

From: Keith Henson <[email-masked]>
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2005 17:36:50 -0500

At 10:40 PM 18/03/05 +1100, Brett Paatsch wrote:
>>update?
>Sorry, I meant upload.

Excuse me if I boggle at someone who can consider uploading and not cryonics.

Keith Henson

---

From: Damien Broderick <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2005 00:10:38 -0600

At 11:37 AM 3/17/2005 +1100, Brett wrote:

>...

Sorry not to have replied to various questions raised on this thread. I was 
away in Florida at the annual academic conference run by the International 
Association for the Fantastic in the Arts, centered on the theme of 
transrealism (I wrote the book on that topic), where to my surprise and 
delight I picked up the Distinguished Scholarship Award for 2005. Cool fun.

As for whether cryonics is cool fun or a waste of money my family could be 
spending after I die (or "die")--well, I'm less concerned about the 
technical issues. That's simply a gamble, and maybe one worth taking *if I 
can truly be recovered*.

For me, the doubt arises from the issue of continuous identity, as we've 
discussed here in numerous debates and which I summarized in THE SPIKE. If 
you have teeny little brushes and a really accurate way to copy the Mona 
Lisa paint fleck by paint fleck, is the copy actually the Mona Lisa? Well, 
no. It's pretty much exactly the same, but exhibit A is the painting that's 
hundreds of years old and exhibit B is a fabrication that closely resembles 
it.

It's too tedious, however, to rehearse this argument when it's been 
presented before quite exhaustively.

Damien Broderick

---

From: Eugen Leitl <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2005 12:34:40 +0100

> For me, the doubt arises from the issue of continuous identity, as we've 

Flat EEG lacunes routinely violate the continuity part of identity, so it's
empirically invalid.

Should we stone these zombies? Clearly, they have no place among us humans.

> Lisa paint fleck by paint fleck, is the copy actually the Mona Lisa? Well, 

If your copying technique is better than the measuring technique there's no
way to tell which is which.

> hundreds of years old and exhibit B is a fabrication that closely resembles 

You can't measure history. If you track history, the information is in the
tracker, not the tracked object.

-- 
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a>
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144            http://www.leitl.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A  7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
http://moleculardevices.org         http://nanomachines.net
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From: BillK <[email-masked]>
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2005 11:47:01 +0000

> tracker, not the tracked object.

Yes, I keep telling people that it would be much more interesting to
rebuild things like Stonehenge and the Parthenon.

Who wants to look at a pile of old stones?

Much better to wander round a rebuilt Palace of Knossos.  ;)

BillK

---

From: Rafal Smigrodzki <[email-masked]>
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2005 15:24:28 -0800

Quoting Damien Broderick <[email-masked]>:
>
> Precisely. I know Eugen and others are equally adamant that the contrary is
> true and self-evident, which I find incomprehensible. It keeps coming back
> to this: if someone persuades me that in a trillion years or so, random
> recurrence will generate an exact equivalent to me as I am at the moment,
> should I feel okay about someone blowing my head off right now? After all,
> "I'll" be alive again (or still alive, or something) in the remote future.
> Bullshit, sez I. Blow your own damn head off.

### Now that the hydra of identity thread reared another head, let me chip in my
usual remarks:

"The others" are not adamant that certain claims about identity are true while
others are false. What I am sure of is my attitude towards certain states of
the world. I simply feel very warm and fuzzy about the future existence of any 
material objects endowed with memories and some character traits reasonably
similar to mine. This enthusiasm is not influenced by any considerations
regarding the way such objects come into existence - whether by continuity,
reassembly, uploading, or tunnelling through the 23rd dimension, I really don't
care.

I know that you have different attitudes about future material,
qualia-experiencing objects similar to you - and these attitudes of ours should
influence each other just as much as our attitudes towards e.g the music of
Radiohead, or ravioli with beef. Strictly a matter of taste.

Rafal

---

From: "Brett Paatsch" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2005 14:14:28 +1100

Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:

> ### Now that the hydra of identity thread reared another head,
> let me chip in my usual remarks:
> 
> "The others" are not adamant that certain claims about identity
> are true while others are false. What I am sure of is my attitude
> towards certain states of the world. I simply feel very warm and
> fuzzy about the future existence of any material objects endowed
> with memories and some character traits reasonably similar to
> mine. This enthusiasm is not influenced by any considerations
> regarding the way such objects come into existence - whether by
> continuity, reassembly, uploading, or tunnelling through the 23rd 
> dimension, I really don't care.
> 
> qualia-experiencing objects similar to you - and these attitudes 
> of ours should influence each other just as much as our attitudes
> towards e.g the music of  Radiohead, or ravioli with beef. Strictly
> a matter of taste.

Rafal, you and I disagree on this. Usually I think your opinions are
well thought through and I respect them. 

But this notion of yours that identity is strictly a matter of taste
seems to produce a bizarre situation where you are going to let
your identity be a matter of someone else's taste. 

You will not be able to upload yourself from your digitised pattern
- you won't be there to do it - so you will need to rely on someone
else's judgement as to whether the you that is captured in digital
form is rendered well enough by some process into the you that is
uploaded or re-instantiated. 

Your biological neural net is unique. Its true that your brain is likely
to be very similarly structured at some levels to the brains of other
homo sapiens (as is mine) but at the level that matters for you its
also going to be profoundly different and unique to you. 

A technological mapping process that takes Rafs digitised brain as
its input and produces Raf as an instantiated output is unlikely to 
be able to be run multiple times because in that future world a 
person is being created each time and that person cannot simply
be tossed away. 

It could very well be that the first instantiation process produces
a Rafal that thinks he is Rafal, and thinks he should have legal 
right to Rafals assets, yet because of imperfect rendering he is two
standard deviations less intelligent that the source Rafal and he is
also missing vast chunks of that Rafal's memories. 

The reviving organisation can hardly just terminate that Rafal as
not a satisfactory enough copy and try again without killing or
annuling the rights of that first copy person. So they are going to
have a very strong incentive to treat the first Rafal that comes
through their reanimation process as the only Rafal. 

Your identity which you hold to be a matter of taste would in
fact turn out to be determined by other peoples taste or worse
by the limits of efficiency in any you-rendering process that can't
be run multiple times (unless the future doesn't care about persons
that are still persons even if they are not good copies of you - and
terminates them - in which case would you *want* to be reanimated
into such a future?).

I see this as analogous to a kid going into a lolly shop and asking
to buy mixed lollies. The kid wants lollies in *any* form and is 
willing to let someone else decide what sort of lollies they get as 
to the kid "what they heck it's all good".  What determines what
lollies the kid gets is what the salesperson has available to give him.
The mixed lollies you get may be the stuff that no other kid wants.
i.e. Your "identity is just a matter of taste" notion might make you
the absolute best candidate for dry running the revival process for
the absolutely first time its tried on any person. 

If that person comes out drooling on himself but can say "I'm Rafal"
then that would be mission accomplished from the service providers
standpoint. His taste and the service providers taste are both satisfied. 

Brett Paatsch