Subject: Re: [extropy-chat] Re: cryonics (was: Science and Fools)

From: [email-masked] ("Hal Finney")
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 2005 00:41:27 -0800 (PST)

Damien writes:
> For me, the doubt arises from the issue of continuous identity, as we've 
> discussed here in numerous debates and which I summarized in THE SPIKE. If 
> you have teeny little brushes and a really accurate way to copy the Mona 
> Lisa paint fleck by paint fleck, is the copy actually the Mona Lisa? Well, 
> no. It's pretty much exactly the same, but exhibit A is the painting that's 
> hundreds of years old and exhibit B is a fabrication that closely resembles 
> it.

I think Brett's point was whether this kind of question can be addressed
via some of the mechanisms we have discussed, such as Idea Futures.
How could you make a bet which would test whether cryonics would "work"?
Or more specifically, how could you make a bet about whether a copy of a
mind is, in some sense, the original?  And if we can't make bets about
these kinds of things, is that then an example of a limitation on what
knowledge we can rationally obtain about the world?

These are interesting issues and I don't have a firm opinion about them.
It's possible that the nature of identity is a meaningless question,
that such a concept of identity is a philosophical error.  But even if
so, that proposition is something that people would disagree about today.
How could we hope to decide whether identity is a meaningful concept, or
merely an illusion?  Is that something we could bet on, and if we try, how
would we settle the bet?  Seems like we're still stuck on the same point.

The best I could propose is that it is likely that at some time in the
future, society will come to a consensus about the answers to these
questions.  Maybe this consensus will arise due to greater scientific
understanding of the brain that leads to an accepted mathematical model
of consciousness and identity.  Or maybe the consensus comes from some
yet to be discovered, mind-bending philosophical proof which utterly
convinces everyone who hears it.  Or it might be that people are just
tired of arguing about it and they adopt a pragmatic attitude, whatever
turns out to be most useful and convenient in a world where technology
has made this question relevant for their day to day lives.

Whatever the reason, we could bet today about what that consensus will be,
once it forms.  That may not be an entirely satisfactory answer to the
question for those who have a pet philosophical argument that convinces
them about the truth of their position.  But they might accept that if
their argument is really that persuasive, it will eventually win over
the skeptics and be represented in the consensus.  That's the best I
could offer in terms of resolving these issues.

Hal
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---

From: "Brett Paatsch" <[email-masked]>
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2005 10:40:26 +1100

----- Original Message ----- 
From: ""Hal Finney"" <[email-masked]>
To: <[email-masked]>
Sent: Tuesday, March 22, 2005 7:41 PM
Subject: Re: [extropy-chat] Re: cryonics (was: Science and Fools)

> Damien writes:
>> For me, the doubt arises from the issue of continuous identity,
>> as we've discussed here in numerous debates and which I summarized
>> in THE SPIKE. If you have teeny little brushes and a really accurate
>> way to copy the Mona Lisa paint fleck by paint fleck, is the copy 
>> actually
>> the Mona Lisa? Well, no. It's pretty much exactly the same, but exhibit A
>> is the painting that's hundreds of years old and exhibit B is a 
>> fabrication
>> that closely resembles it.
>

Yes. Indeed.

> How could you make a bet which would test whether cryonics would

For Damien such a test would be superfluous.

> Or more specifically, how could you make a bet about whether a copy
> of a mind is, in some sense, the original?

This problem (our disagreement) doesn't reside in the domain of science.
It resides in the domain of language and logic.

>  And if we can't make bets about

We can make bets I think. But to judge bets where the relevant domains
are logic and language we'd need judges with experts in those domains.

I think its a mistake to see cryonics as essentially a scientific 
disagreement.
I think its is essentially a logical disagreement.

> that such a concept of identity is a philosophical error.

But that is a problem for you isn't it Hal? I mean if you or anyone that
signed up for cryonics holds that identity is a a meaningless question
how could you be confident that an organisation that tries to revive you
would have even a similar notion to you as to what constitutes you?

Your identity is crucial to the nature of the service you are trying to
buy. How could you be confident of getting even the service providers
best efforts at service provision if there is no agreement possible about
your identity because the concept of identity is a philosophical error?

I think those who are choosing cryonics are making a logical error
about the nature of identity.

I think if we set up a bet on whether cryonics can work and found
experts that you, Robin, Damien and I, all thought were extremely
competent in dealing with logical matters (as well as able to bring
in any scientific experts that they wish) that some of those judges
might feel that they would be able to rule on the question almost
immediately.

Even if only 5% or 1% of the population are capable of dealing
very well with logical arguments, I would certainly think that any
one of you and Robin and either of Damien or I could together
agree on some way to select candidate judges from that 5% or
1%.

Regards,
Brett Paatsch